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COMMENTS
UNILATERAL TARIFF EXCULPATION IN THE
ERA OF COMPETITIVE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
The Communications Act of 1934 (Communications Act or Act)' governs
the regulation of communications in the United States and allocates jurisdic-
tion over common carriers between federal and state regulators.' In the last
decade, the communications industry has undergone a technological, com-
petitive, and regulatory revolution,3 with new and emerging technologies
challenging the bounds of the Act.4 Only liberal interpretation of the Act
1. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (1988).
2. See 47 U.S.C. § 152. A common carrier is "any person engaged as a common carrier
for hire." 47 U.S.C. § 153(h). Implicit in the common carrier concept is that the carrier
"under takes [sic] to carry for all people indifferently." National Ass'n of Regulatory Util.
Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see id. at 641-42 (discussing the defini-
tion of common carrier). The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has rejected the
common law requirement of "holding out" with regard to communications common carriers.
See In re Policy & Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Servs. & Facili-
ties Authorizations, Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 84 F.C.C.2d 445, 534, para. 47
(1981) [hereinafter Further Notice]. Regulations specifically pertaining to communications
common carriers are set forth in Title II of the Act. 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-224. Section 203 of the
Communications Act requires common carriers to file rate schedules with the FCC. 47 U.S.C.
§ 203(a). Traditionally, "tariffs," as these rate schedules are known, were filed by the common
carrier and gave notice of the rates, obligations and parameters for the service. These tariffs
were then reviewed and approved by the FCC. See generally Further Notice, supra, at para. 20
(describing the multi-step review and approval process under rate-of-return regulation). The
FCC used the tariff approval process as a regulatory and information mechanism. MCI
Telecom. Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186, 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
3. See, e.g., WALTER G. BOLTER ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY FOR THE
1990s AND BEYOND 359 (1990) (describing "the technological, competitive and policy up-
heaval of the 1980s" in the telecommunications industry); NATIONAL TELECOM. AND INFOR-
MATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NTIA SPECIAL PUB. No. 88, NTIA TELECOM
2000: CHARTING THE COURSE FOR A NEW CENTURY 22 (1988) (noting that "[tlwenty years
ago . . . most facets of the U.S. domestic and international communications business were
appreciably different"). In contrast, "[i]n 1934, when it considered and ultimately adopted the
Communications Act, Congress faced an industry that was largely absent of competitive
forces." Further Notice, supra note 2, at para. 43.
4. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613.
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will sustain its goals in the vastly different communications environment of
the 1990s.5 Indeed, numerous advocates for revamping the Act exist.6
Since 1980, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commis-
sion) has systematically realigned the telecommunications industry toward
competition7 by providing carriers with greater flexibility to meet the de-
mands of their subscribers.' The FCC increasingly relies on the market to
regulate activities of nondominant carriers in competitive markets. 9 Carriers
subject to this relaxed regulation flourish in this competitive era."° While
5. The FCC, in considering deregulation of the industry in 1981, examined the congres-
sional purpose behind the Act and noted that "continued rigid uniform application of Title II
requirements to all market participants threatens to undermine [industry] dynamism and in
turn betray the overriding goals of the Act." Further Notice, supra note 2, at para. 33(a).
Furthermore, in examining legal precedent in the enabling Communications Act for its regula-
tory forbearance policy, the FCC stated "[t]here can be no doubt, however, of our broad
discretion and flexibility to adjust to the dynamic and rapidly changing nature of the commu-
nications industry. Congress foresaw that circumstances and conditions might change and,
accordingly, gave this agency broad powers to respond appropriately to such events." Id. at
para. 71.
6. Congressional legislation proposing wholesale revision of the Communications Act
has been regularly introduced. See BOLTER, supra note 3, at 100 (describing the demise of the
1976 Consumer Communications Reform Act, the Telecommunications Competition and De-
regulation Acts of 1981 and the Telecommunications Act of 1981).
7. The FCC sought to gradually deregulate the telecommunications industry and allow
competitive markets to emerge. See Further Notice, supra note 2, at paras. 3-8.
8. Beginning with its First Report, the FCC gave special streamlined regulatory over-
sight-oversight in the sense of overlooked, not in the sense of carefully scrutinized-to non-
dominant carriers. In re Policy & Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier
Servs. & Facilities Authorizations, First Report & Order, 85 F.C.C.2d 1 (1980) [hereinafter
First Report]. The term "subscribers" as used in this Comment refers to customers using the
common carrier services.
9. Those carriers lacking market power are nondominant, while those carriers with mar-
ket power are dominant. Id. para. 56. Competitive entry into a regulated market "has the
effect of not only making more and newer service options available to customers; it also has the
effect of forcing the firms that are already in the business to be more responsive and to adapt."
Competition in the Common Carrier Communications Field: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Communications of the House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 94 Cong., 2d Sess.
1096-97 (1976) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Donald I. Baker, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice). Market regulation, therefore, assumes that ineffi-
ciencies will be reflected in the demand for the service. See, e.g., Mark S. Fowler et al., "Back
to the Future:" A Model for Telecommunications, 38 FED. COMM. L.J. 145 (1986). Under
perfectly competitive conditions, the market functions as "a system in which individuals or
other entities may freely buy or sell inputs or outputs, guided by their own goals and tastes and
by relative prices which, in turn, are free to change in response to the market decisions of the
various players." BOLTER, supra note 3, at 63. Negligence can be viewed as an inefficiency
that is corrected through the award of damages. Cf id. at 64 ("[M]arket imperfections distort
the operation of a free market because of deviations from one or more of the conditions requi-
site for 'perfect competition.' ").
10. For example, "the percentage of interstate switched traffic carried by AT&T's com-




these carriers embrace minimal regulatory oversight, they cling to certain
incidents of regulation, such as the exculpation doctrine."
Historically, common carriers were required to file tariffs with the FCC.
These tariffs contained provisions that limit carrier liability in the event of
mistakes or errors in transmission. 2 Tariff provisions, once approved by the
reviewing authority, bind both carriers and their customers, regardless of
notice to subscribers. 3 Thus, the carrier, in drafting tariff provisions, unilat-
erally provides for its own liability exculpation. Given the recent funda-
mental changes that have occurred in regulation of telecommunications
companies and the emergence of a new breed of non-rate-regulated, competi-
tive companies, extension of the doctrine of unilateral liability exculpation,
without some corresponding contractual bargained-for consent, may ignore
the public interest touchstone of the Communications Act."' This issue re-
quires a critical evaluation of who has the power to decide whether liability
limits are appropriate today. Several legal and regulatory doctrines interact
in this analysis, including the primary jurisdiction of administrative agen-
cies, federal preemption of state laws, and the nature of FCC common car-
rier regulation or forbearance from regulation.
This Comment explores the 1920s doctrine of exculpation of liability as it
applies to nondominant carriers filing tariffs with the FCC. It begins by
reviewing the history of tariff exculpation clauses and the various policy ra-
tionales behind their application at the federal and state levels. 5 Next, this
Comment delineates the role of the courts and the FCC in reviewing the
applicability of the doctrine. This Comment then evaluates these issues in
the context of a recent Third Circuit case, Richman Bros. Records v. U.S.
11. The doctrine of unilateral exculpation of liability or, as it has been called, the money
back guarantee, was formulated by Justice Brandeis in the 1920s-predating the Communica-
tions Act itself. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Esteve Bros., 256 U.S. 566 (1921) (allowing
tariff provisions to limit carriers' liability for telegraph mistransmissions to a refund of the
charge for the message). As the FCC continues to reconsider regulation of competitive provid-
ers, the doctrine and its extension to nondominant carriers in the competitive era must also be
reexamined. See, e.g., Further Notice, supra note 2, at paras. 4-8 (articulating the need to re-
examine Commission policies in light of emerging competition). Indeed, it may be time to
rethink the application of the rule to all competitive carriers, dominant and nondominant
alike.
12. See, e.g., infra note 154, for an example of an exculpatory provision.
13. See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
14. See 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1988) (requiring that carriers operate in the public interest).
These issues are being challenged at the administrative and judicial levels. See Richman Bros.
Records v. U.S. Sprint Communications Co., Nos. 90-5607, 90-5657 (3d Cir. Dec. 31, 1991)
(upholding a district court order transferring the case to the FCC under the doctrine of pri-
mary jurisdiction), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3879 (U.S. June 29, 1992).
15. Analogies from treatment at the state and federal levels provide insight into the appro-
priate application in the modem regulatory system. See, e.g., Nader v. Allegheny Airlines,
Inc., 426 U.S. 290 (1976).
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Sprint Communications Co. 16 Richman challenges the limited recovery pro-
vided by an exculpatory tariff clause. 17 Finally, this Comment examines the
need for change in the modern telecommunications environment and con-
cludes that competition will not tolerate the continuation of unilateral tariff
exculpations.
I. REGULATORY OVERSIGHT AND TARIFF LIMITATIONS
The Communications Act, largely adopting sections from the Interstate
Commerce Act, was enacted in 1934 with little congressional consideration
of the impact of these provisions on the emerging communications indus-
try. 8 Similarly, the case law involving exculpatory clauses that developed in
the pre-Communications Act era was applied without change in the new
regulatory environment.' 9 Thus, it is necessary to examine the rationales
behind the exculpation tariffs as they emerged, as well as the evolution of
regulatory oversight of carriers and tariffs.
A. Unilateral Tariff Liability Exculpation Clauses
1. Early Cases
Early in the century, courts validated tariff exculpatory clauses filed with
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). The United States Supreme
Court first addressed the issue of liability exculpation clauses in the 1920s
with cases involving Western Union Telegraph Company.20 In 1921, Justice
Brandeis examined whether Western Union could limit potential liability
through the use of a bifurcated tariff rate structure in Western Union Tele-
graph Co. v. Esteve Bros.2 Although mistransmission of an unrepeated
16. Richman Bros. Records v. U.S. Sprint Communications Co., No. 88-4908 (D.N.J.
June 22, 1990), appeal dismissed, Richman Bros. Records v. U.S. Sprint Communications Co.,
Nos. 90-5607, 90-5657 (3d Cir. Dec. 31, 1991), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3879 (U.S. June 29,
1992).
17. Id. at 3-4.
18. See Kathleen B. Levitz, Loosening the Ties That Bind: Regulating the Interexchange
Services Market for the 1990s, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 1495, 1496 (1987).
Title II of the Act borrows heavily from the regulatory provisions of the Interstate
Commerce Act in effect in 1934. Title II incorporates not only the portions of the
latter that had explicitly governed telephone and telegraph companies, but also parts
that had applied only to regulation of transportation common carriers.
Id. (citation omitted).
19. See infra notes 33-43 and accompanying text.
20. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Priester, 276 U.S. 252 (1928); Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Esteve Bros., 256 U.S. 566 (1921).
21. 256 U.S. 566 (1921). Western Union's tariff provided two rates: a higher rate for
repeated telegraphs and a "basic" rate for unrepeated telegraphs. Id. at 569. The basic rate
for telegraphs applied for messages relayed at the sender's risk, with liability limited to the
ninety cents toll collected. Id. at 568-69. The rate was higher for repeated messages, because
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message resulted in substantial damage to Esteve,22 the Court nonetheless
upheld the liability limitation.23 In its reasoning, the Court noted that prior
to enactment of the June 18, 1910 amendment to the Act to Regulate Com-
merce, companies could only exculpate themselves from common law liabil-
ity if permitted by the policy of the governing jurisdiction.24 However, by
virtue of the 1910 amendment, such companies were subject to the estab-
lished rule of national rate uniformity.25 Hence, the Court found that the
liability limit, filed with the ICC in 1916, was not only lawful, but an inher-
ent part of the rate structure under the uniformity requirement.2 6
A similar issue came before the Court seven years later in Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Priester.27 Seeking recovery for damages occasioned by a
mistransmission of an unrepeated message,28 Priester relied on the public
policy distinction between liability limitations for ordinary and gross negli-
gence. 29 The Court refused to impose liability under the theory of gross
the message was transmitted back to the company for verification. Id. at 569. While repeated
messages provided greater accuracy, they also imposed greater liability on Western Union of
up to fifty times the toll charged. Id. at 575.
22. Esteve received an unrepeated message directing them to sell 2000 bales of cotton
instead of the correct request to sell 200 bales of cotton. Id. at 568. This resulted in a loss of
$31,095 to Esteve. Id.
23. Id. at 575. Western Union filed rates with the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC) under the Act to Regulate Commerce. Id. at 568. The tariff included a provision limit-
ing liability for mistakes or omissions in unrepeated messages. Id. at 568-69. Esteve had no
notice and did not actually assent to the liability limitation because the form used to place the
telegram did not carry the standard disclaimer. Id. at 569. Esteve was likewise unaware of the
tariff. Id.
24. Id. at 571-72.
25. Id. at 571.
26. Id. at 568, 572. In Esteve, the Court rejected the rationale used in the earlier case of
Primrose v. Western Union Tel. Co., 154 U.S. 1 (1894). The rate was not a matter of contract,
with the attendant requirement of notice, but a matter of law imposing uniform limits on
liability, as established in baggage carriage cases. Esteve, 256 U.S. at 572. The Court declined
to decide whether liability limits on repeated messages were valid. Id. at 575. Thus, after
Esteve, "[s]ince any deviation from the lawful rate would involve either an undue preference or
an unjust discrimination, a rate lawfully established must apply equally to all, whether there is
knowledge of it or not." Id. at 573. Some state tariff decisions continue to rely on the contract
theory. See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
27. 276 U.S. 252 (1928).
28. Priester alleged gross negligence in Western Union's erroneous transmission substitut-
ing "fifteen cents" for "fifty cents" in an unrepeated message. Id. at 256. The tariff limited
liability to $50. Id. at 256-57 n.1.
29. This distinction was upheld in Primrose. 154 U.S. at 17-19. The Court noted that
since the Primrose decision, telegraph carriers became subject to the Interstate Commerce Act
(ICA), 49 U.S.C. § 1, and ICC tariff approval. Priester, 276 U.S. at 259. The ICA provided
for differential rates for repeated and unrepeated messages and mandated uniform rates. Thus,
because the tariff was approved by the ICC, as required under the ICA, the tariffed rates were
the only lawful rates and were conditioned on the limited liability. Id. This rate "represents
the whole duty and the whole liability of the company." Id. (quoting Esteve, 256 U.S. at 572).
Nevertheless, some state court decisions explicitly refuse to uphold limits on recovery for gross
1992]
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negligence when regulatory approval had not made that distinction.3 ° With
these two cases, the Court established the validity of exculpatory clauses in
communications tariffs. These decisions remained untouched throughout
implementation of the Communications Act in 1934 and continue to persist
in today's competitive environment.
2. Current Application
Judge-made law regarding unilateral tariff liability exculpation clauses, in-
terpreted and applied by the courts for the last seventy years, balances the
effect of regulatory obligations, such as the mandate of uniform common
carrier rates,3 1 with the courts' traditional application of the common law,
including the public policy concerns attendant to limited liability.32 Unilat-
eral tariff liability limitations have been upheld on three distinct bases.
First, in upholding limited liability, some courts consider the strength of
regulatory power and oversight. State and federal courts have held that the
right to limit liability of regulated common carriers is an inherent part of
regulatory power.33 Under this view, regulatory oversight by the FCC
guards against unreasonable tariff provisions that contravene public policy.
34
Second, liability limits persist because courts fear the impact of liability
judgments on rates paid by captive ratepayers.3 5 Courts argue that extensive
liability awards would be passed on to the general body of ratepayers
through the fair return doctrine inherent in rate-of-return or price caps regu-
negligence or willful conduct. See supra notes 44-45; see also supra note 48 (discussing federal
court decisions involving state tariffs).
30. Priester, 276 U.S. at 260.
31. Uniform common carrier rates are not explicitly mandated by the Communications
Act. Under § 201(b) of the Act, common carriers must establish just and reasonable rates. 47
U.S.C. § 201(b). Similarly, § 202(a) requires no unjust or unreasonable discrimination for like
communications services. 47 U.S.C. § 202(a). In Esteve, the Court interpreted the ban against
undue preferential treatment of § 3 of the Act to Regulate Commerce to require national uni-
formity. Esteve, 256 U.S. at 571.
32. Limited liability for negligence raises public policy concerns because carriers are not
held responsible for their negligent behavior to the full extent of the damage caused. See, e.g.,
Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co. v. River Terminals Corp., 360 U.S. 411, 418 (1959).
33. Travelers Ins. Co. v. SCM Corp., 600 F. Supp. 493, 496 (D.D.C. 1984) (finding lim-
ited liability inherent in regulatory power); Pilot Indus. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 495
F. Supp. 356, 361 (D.S.C. 1979) (stating liability "limitation exists as an integral part of the
rate-making function ... that is totally regulated by state and federal agencies").
34. Professional Answering Serv. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 565 A.2d 55, 64
(D.C. 1989).
35. See Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Ivencheck, Inc., 204 S.E.2d 457, 460 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1974) (noting public interest served by reasonable rates based on liability limits); see also
Pilot Indu&, 495 F. Supp. at 361; Cole v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 246 P.2d 686 (Cal. Ct. App.
1979). A captive ratepayer is a subscriber who obtains service from a monopoly provider and
therefore cannot seek a more competitively priced alternative.
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lation.36 This rationale assumes that, as a matter of public policy, the "pub-
lic interest" standard contemplates reasonable rates.37 Because the costs of
these judgments would be passed on to ratepayers with no alternative service
source, liability limitations that apply to monopoly providers serve the pub-
lic interest and are, therefore, not unconscionable.38
Third, courts have upheld limited liability provisions in order to preserve
national uniformity39 and prevent disparate treatment by preempting state
authority to regulate on this issue. Although the Esteve Court did not ad-
dress the issue as one of preemption," the national uniformity rationale ar-
ticulated in Esteve and Priester is a preemption argument.4 National
36. Under rate-of-return regulation, carriers are authorized to receive a specified "fair"
return on capital as set by the regulatory authority. Levitz, supra note 18, at 1496. If legal fees
and awards are included in the rate base for the utility, then these costs are in turn passed on to
ratepayers through the authorized rate of return. Under price caps regulation, the maximum
allowable rate for service is set by the regulating agency, and companies are permitted to keep
any profits generated through provision of service, as long as rates do not exceed the capped
levels. Id. at 1500. Thus, ratepayers could bear the cost of judgments against the telephone
company either through rates increased to the maximum level or alternatively through reduc-
tions in the quality of service or other cost-cutting measures.
37. See, e.g., Professional Answering Serv., 565 A.2d at 64.
38. Pilot Indus., 495 F. Supp. at 361.
39. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Priester, 276 U.S. 252 (1928); Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Esteve Bros., 256 U.S. 566 (1921).
40. The Court was concerned with maintaining national uniformity. Esteve, 256 U.S. at
571.
41. It is likely that this preemption issue was not addressed by Justice Brandeis in Esteve
for two reasons. First, in 1921, there was no Communications Act and therefore no clause
preserving state common law remedies. The Communications Act was enacted in 1934. 47
U.S.C. §§ 151-163 (1988). While Title II of the Act incorporated substantial portions of the
ICA relating to the regulation of communications, it went far beyond the ICA in other re-
spects. Levitz, supra note 18, at 1496. The broad mandate provided to the Commission in § 1
of the Communications Act was entirely unpredicated in the ICA. G. Hamilton Loeb, The
Communications Act Policy Toward Competition: A Failure to Communicate, 1978 DUKE L.J.
1, 21.
Second, these 1920s decisions were handed down before Justice Brandeis authored the opin-
ion in the Court's famous 1938 decision of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), which
abolished the use of federal common law in diversity cases. Id. at 78. In the 1920s, diversity
cases were decided under the "brooding omnipresence" of federal common law. Charles E.
Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts. The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55
YALE L.J. 267, 274-75 (1946). Prior to Erie, federal common law applied to diversity cases
and controversies in federal court under Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). Under
Swift, the word "laws," as used in the Judiciary Act of 1789, did not include state common
law, and the federal courts were therefore free to apply federal law to state questions in diver-
sity cases. Id. at 18-19. After Erie, federal courts were compelled to apply state common law
principles in diversity cases unless the Constitution or an Act of Congress provided otherwise.
Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. Thus, there was no need for the Esteve Court to address whether there
was a state claim with a corresponding federal defense. Thus, in Ivy Broadcasting v. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., 391 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968), the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit relied on the cases from the 1920s to conclude that all questions regarding
duties, charges, and liabilities of telegraph or telephone carriers should be governed solely by
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uniformity requires rates to be applied in the same manner throughout the
country.42 If some users were allowed to recover damages occasioned under
basic unrepeated service, then these customers would in effect get preferen-
tial treatment in contravention of the uniformity requirement.4 3
Thus, the doctrine continues to be applied today. However, the underly-
ing judicial rationales rest on a presumption of active regulatory involve-
ment. Such active regulation continues in large measure at the state level.
Even with active state regulation, decisions considering liability limita-
tions in state tariffs reach conflicting results. Many state law decisions up-
hold the validity of exculpatory clauses." On the other hand, numerous
federal common law, id. at 490-91, and therefore states were precluded from acting in this
area. Id. at 491.
Additionally, the preemption doctrine has evolved significantly in the last 20 years. See
John R. Haring & Kathleen B. Levitz, The Law and Economics of Federalism in Telecommu-
nications, 41 FED. COMM. L.J. 261 (1989) (tracing the evolution of the preemption doctrine in
the last 20 years as it relates to communications). Today, it is very difficult to find preemption
of state common law without express congressional fiat. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, Ill S.
Ct. 2395, 2401 (1991) (requiring express congressional intent to override state laws and upset
the constitutional balance between federal and state governments); Louisiana Pub. Serv.
Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355 (1986) (invalidating FCC regulation of intrastate depreciation
rates where no clear Congressional mandate can be discerned). Thus, Justice Brandeis's rea-
soning relies on rationales that probably would not survive the more stringent test for preemp-
tion that the Supreme Court currently demands. See, e.g., Haring & Levitz, supra, at 330
("The Louisiana decision appears to undermine, but not unequivocally preclude, effective ef-
forts to internalize extrajurisdictional effects of state actions.").
42. Esteve, 256 U.S. at 571.
43. Id. at 573. This argument fails to account for differences in service (e.g., one cus-
tomer's message was transmitted properly and one customer's message was garbled) and fo-
cuses solely on the price-risk relationship. Id.
44. A broad range of cases uphold tariff liability clauses as binding. See, e.g., Olson v.
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 580 P.2d 782 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (holding absent proof of
willful or wanton misconduct, plaintiff can only recover amount of charge in accordance with
limited liability under tariff); Sommer v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 519 P.2d 874 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1974) (holding tariff limiting liability became part of contract when telephone com-
pany filed with regulator and is binding unless misconduct is willful and wanton); Waters v.
Pacific Tel. Co., 523 P.2d 1161 (Cal. 1974) (holding court award of damages would interfere
with regulatory approval of tariff liability clause); University Hills Beauty Academy, Inc. v.
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 554 P.2d 723 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976) (holding liability limits
are valid when fairly made and may preclude recovery, otherwise court makes telephone com-
pany an insurer contrary to settled law); Shoemaker v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 559
P.2d 721 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976) (holding any common law remedy inconsistent with tariff was
extinguished when tariff created through properly delegated legislated authority); Woloshin v.
Diamond State Tel. Co., 380 A.2d 982 (Del. Ch. 1977) (holding telephone company agreement
limiting liability was not unconscionable or violative of public policy when applied to two
attorneys); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. C & S Realty, 233 S.E.2d 9 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977)
(holding company not liable when tariffs and contracts limit liability unless showing of gross
negligence); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Ivenchek, Inc., 204 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. Ct. App.
1974) (holding reasonable liability limits on damages may be part of telephone ratemaking
process subject to jurisdiction of regulators unless it limits recovery for willful misconduct);
Burdick v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 675 P.2d 922 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984) (holding exculpa-
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decisions dealing with state regulation of tariff liability clauses have invali-
dated the clauses.45
tory tariffs valid unless telephone company's conduct is willful and wanton); John Cannon
Agency v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 341 N.W.2d 115 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (holding tariff is
contract between parties and therefore limits on liability are presumptively valid); Coachlight
Las Cruces, Ltd. v. Mountain Bell Tel. Co., 664 P.2d 994 (N.M. Ct. App.) (stating authority
lies with regulators to approve tariff liability limits, and thus, tariff limiting recovery to gross
negligence or willful misconduct was valid), cert. quashed, 664 P.2d 985 (N.M. 1983) (quash-
ing for lack of jurisdiction); Garrison v. Pacific Nw. Bell, 608 P.2d 1206 (Or. Ct. App. 1980)
(holding liability limitations are a reasonable function of regulatory oversight as long as com-
pany not sheltered from gross negligence); Behrend v. Bell Tel. Co., 363 A.2d 1152 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1976) (holding provisions of tariffs properly filed with regulators enforceable against cus-
tomers with the effect of law), vacated, 374 A.2d 536 (Pa. 1977); Morris v. Mountain States
Tel. & Tel. Co, 658 P.2d 1199 (Utah 1983) (holding telephone company not liable for lost
profits in face of liability limit in contract for directory services); Allen v. General Tel. Co., 578
P.2d 1333 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (binding customers subscribing to yellow pages directory
service to liability disclaimer in tariff); Tate v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 647 P.2d 58
(Wyo. 1982) (holding tariff liability limits are not against public policy but limits on gross
negligence conflict with statutory standards of comparative negligence and are unenforceable).
45. Numerous state courts have decided that tariff liability limits were not binding. See,
e.g., Morgan v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 466 So. 2d 107 (Ala. 1985) (holding exculpatory
clause in directory contract violates public policy); Anchorage v. Locker, 723 P.2d 1261
(Alaska 1986) (holding that a tangential effect on rates will not suffice to limit phone company
liability categorically, and phone company may not unilaterally limit liability for negligence);
Maddalena v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 382 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (hold-
ing tariff clause and letter with contract liability clauses do not effectively limit liability and
limiting damages only by what plaintiff can prove); Vendola v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,
474 So. 2d 275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (refusing to relieve telephone company of common
law duty owed to 911 caller because company reliance on tariff as exculpatory shield from tort
liability misplaced); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 262
S.E.2d 895 (Ga. 1980) (holding tariff is contract between company and its customers and be-
cause plaintiff's claim does not fall within tariff exculpation clause when strictly construed,
nothing in tariff alters petitioner's claim as it exists under general law of state); Bunch v. South
Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 356 So. 2d 104 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that because plaintiff's action
sounded in negligence, damages were not limited by contract between the parties); Thomas v.
General Tel. Directory Co., 339 N.W.2d 257 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (holding liability limits
only pertain to contract obligations between parties and thus recovery in tort is not limited);
W.E. Westfall, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 341 N.W.2d 514 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (holding
limitations on liability set forth in tariffs have no application in a tort action against telephone
company brought in court of general jurisdiction); Tannock v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 515
A.2d 814 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986) (holding that telephone company should spread risk
of its negligence among subscribers and thus it is unfair to subordinate an advertiser to blanket
liability clause in order to decrease cost to general class of advertisers), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 537 A.2d 1307 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988); Albuquerque Tire Co. v. Mountain
States Tel. & Tel. Co., 697 P.2d 128 (N.M. 1985) (holding public utility cannot contract
against liability for negligence because it contravenes public interest; however, for non-essen-
tial services, contractual liability limitation clauses are not against public policy and will be
judged by contract standards for adhesion contracts); Olson v. Pacific Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 671
P.2d 1185 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) (holding legislature intended actions for negligence, gross negli-
gence, and breach of contract were appropriate when telephone company breached its statu-
tory duty and stating that tariff exculpation clause does not insulate company from all liability,
but may limit liability as long as it does not eliminate it); Discount Fabric House of Racine,
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Frequently, state law decisions distinguish between causes of action
sounding in tort and contract when deciding whether to uphold liability lim-
its.46 This distinction is critical; parties entering into a contract must have
notice and typically have an opportunity to bargain. None of the indicia of
healthy contractual relations attends a tariffed limitation. Therefore, in
Travelers Insurance Co. v. SCM Corp. , the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia upheld a contractual limit on liability as enforcea-
ble in light of clear and unambiguous contractual language aad the parties'
sophistication and bargaining power.48 In Helms v. Southwestern Bell Tele-
phone Co.," the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit strug-
gled with the issue of whether liability limitations properly apply to
negligence claims, as opposed to breach of contract claims,5" and concluded
that this distinction was tenuous but supported by Texas law.5 Thus, the
court upheld the negligence claim, even in the face of previous cases refusing
to allow breach of contract claims.
5 2
Inc. v. Wisconsin Tel. Co., 345 N.W.2d 417 (Wis. 1984) (holding contract limiting damages to
money back was an unconscionable and unenforceable exculpatory contract contrary to public
policy).
46. Some courts have refused to extend liability limits applicable to contractual relations
to situations involving torts. See, e.g., Thomas v. General Tel. Directory Co., 339 N.W.2d 257
(Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (holding liability limits only pertain to contract obligations between
parties and thus recovery in tort is not limited; once tortious conduct is properly alleged,
plaintiff may proceed and recover in court of general jurisdiction).
47. 600 F. Supp. 493 (D.D.C. 1984).
48. Id. at 495. The court specifically noted that the Public Utility Commission had cho-
sen to limit liability for public policy reasons as a function of the rate-setting process. Id. at
495-96. In particular, the court commented that a tariff is not a private contract between the
parties but a public regulation. Id. at 496. Cf Stand Buys, Ltd. v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 646
F. Supp. 36 (E.D. Mich. 1986). Stand Buys involved a local telephone company tariff that
limited liability when there was no showing of willful or wanton misconduct. Id. at 38. The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that the tariff was the
law with respect to any claims for damages. Id. at 37. In Pilot Indus. v. Southern Bell Tel. &
Tel. Co., 495 F. Supp. 356, 362 (D.S.C. 1979), the court found liability limits reasonable when
liability for gross negligence was not limited. This distinction was offered in Priester, but the
Supreme Court refused to recognize differing degrees of negligence. Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Priester, 276 U.S. 252, 260 (1928).
49. 794 F.2d 188 (5th Cir. 1986).
50. Id. at 194.
51. Id. The court noted that "under Texas law actions for breach of contract and negli-
gence are not necessarily mutually exclusive." Id. at 194; see also Montgomery Ward & Co. v.
Scharrenbeck, 204 S.W.2d 508, 510 (Tex. 1947) (holding that a duty of care is implicit in every
contract).
52. Helms, 794 F.2d at 194. The court reasoned that a Texas Court of Appeals recog-
nized a negligence claim in Reuben H. Donnelly Corp. v. McKinnon, 688 S.W.2d 612 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1985), writ ref'd n.r.e. (1985), thereby effectively rejecting an earlier unqualified en-
dorsement of liability limitations established in Wade v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 352
S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Ct. App. 1961). The Fifth Circuit found Texas Supreme Court support for
this reasoning in the writ of refusal. Helms, 794 F.2d at 194 n.14 (" 'writ ref'd n.r.e.,' means
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While these state decisions are instructive, they are not dispositive. Most
state decisions do not consider the issue of competition because state regula-
tors deal primarily with regulated monopolies and not deregulated competi-
tive companies.53 Therefore, although state decisions are not dispositive,
they indicate the persistence of the exculpation doctrine. The critical ques-
tion thus becomes whether these limits remain appropriate in the modem
regulatory environment.
B. Deregulation and the Role of FCC Regulation
of Nondominant Carriers
Throughout most of the twentieth century, long-distance telephone ser-
vice was a monopoly market controlled by American Telephone & Tele-
graph (AT&T).5 4 Since 1980, however, a revolution in policy and regulation
occurred in the industry.55 The FCC has substantially altered regulation of
the communications industry in the last decade through its Competitive Car-
'Writ Refused, No Reversible Error.' 'A decision to... refuse a writ 'n.r.e.' is a statement on
the merits of the appeal ....... (citation omitted)).
53. The Modified Final Judgment (MFJ) broke the monopoly held by AT&T into seven
regional holding companies for 22 monopoly local service providers. See United States v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 226-32 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 460 U.S. 1001
(1983). Each local telephone company retained monopoly control over a provision of local
telephone service. Id. at 227-28. See generally United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F.
Supp. 990 (D.D.C. 1983).
Nonetheless, in recent years state regulators have gained some experience with competitive
offerings of telephone directory services. However, although many states allow competing tel-
ephone directories, the providers are regulated and the directory services represent a substan-
tial and essential contribution to local revenues. See American Tel., 552 F. Supp. at 231
(establishing that directory services will be provided by local telephone companies upon divest-
iture). The AT&T MFJ segregated the nation into 164 "local access and transport areas"
(LATAs) roughly corresponding to standard metropolitan statistical areas. Western Elec., 569
F. Supp. at 994 nn.8-9; see Levitz, supra note 18, at 1504 n.58. Within these LATAs, the local
telephone companies provide all service, and outside of these LATAs, the local telephone com-
panies are prohibited from providing service. See Levitz, supra note 18, at 1504 n.58. Local
telephone companies' revenues are derived from a provision of intraLATA services. Directory
services were designated local services to bolster revenues for local telephone companies and to
help maintain lower local rates. See American Tel., 552 F. Supp. at 228 (including "directory
services" within the definition of exchange services to be provided by the local telephone
companies).
54. Heavy regulation was historically appropriate for monopoly service providers; regual-
tion of AT&T's monopoly was achieved through entry and exit controls. Further Notice, supra
note 2, at 452 (describing traditional public utility rate regulation). In fact, "scarcely a single
business act [was] free from continuous regulation or at least administrative governmental
review." Carter v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 365 F.2d 486, 495 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1008 (1967).
55. There has been a "revolution in telecommunications occasioned by the federal policy
of increasing competition in the industry." Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. F.C.C., 476 U.S.
355, 358 (1986).
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rier decisions,56 in which streamlined forbearance regulation" applies to
nondominant carriers.5" The FCC has effectively deregulated competitive
telecommunications providers.59
The FCC's gradual approach to deregulation of the long-distance tele-
phone industry began in 1979 when the Commission sought comment on a
broad range of options concerning regulation of nondominant carriers."
After reviewing these comments, the FCC issued the First Report delineating
between dominant and nondominant carriers on the basis of their market
power.6 The FCC announced that streamlined regulations would pertain to
nondominant carriers, allowing tariffs to become effective on fourteen days
notice and establishing a presumption that tariffed rates were lawful.6 2
In 1981, the FCC sought additional comment on whether to undertake
"deferential" or "forbearance" deregulation in one of two ways. First, the
Commission could classify certain nondominant carriers of communications
services as noncommon carriers, such that Title II of the Communications
56. The FCC considered competition in the telecommunications market in the Competi-
tion Carrier Docket No. 79-252. First Report, supra note 8; In re Policy & Rules Concerning
Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Servs. & Facilities Authorizations, Second Report &
Order, 91 F.C.C.2d 59 (1982) [hereinafter Second Report]; In re Policy & Rules Concerning
Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Servs. & Facilities Authorizations, Third Report &
Order, 48 Fed. Reg. 46791 (Oct. 14, 1983) [hereinafter Third Report]; In re Policy & Rules
Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Servs. & Facilities Authorizations, Fourth
Report & Order, 95 F.C.C.2d 554 (1983) [hereinafter Fourth Report]; In re Policy & Rules
Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Servs. & Facilities Authorizations, Fifth
Report & Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1191 (1984) [hereinafter Fifth Report]; In re Policy & Rules
Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Servs. & Facilities Authorizations, Sixth
Report & Order, 99 F.C.C.2d 1020 (1985) [hereinafter Sixth Report].
57. Under forbearance regulation a carrier is exempted from certain Title II regulatory
requirements. See Further Notice, supra note 2, at para. 3.
58. The landmark Competitive Carrier docket divided telecommunications providers into
dominant and nondominant carriers based on their relative market power. First Report, supra
note 8, at para. 56. Those carriers lacking market power are nondominant, while those carri-
ers with market power are considered dominant. Id.
59. One court noted that the Competitive Carrier rulemaking has undertaken the "grad-
ual deregulation of the nondominant common carrier interstate telephone industry." MCI
Telecom., Inc. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
60. In re Policy & Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Servs. &
Facilities Authorizations, Notice of Inquiry & Proposed Rulemaking, 77 F.C.C.2d 308 (1979)
[hereinafter Notice]. This proceeding was commenced to respond to "changes ... in the do-
mestic telecommunications industry." Id. at para. 2.
61. The FCC determines market power on the basis of a carrier's power to control prices.
First Report, supra note 8, at paras. 15, 25, 56.
62. Id. para. 16. These streamlined provisions were deemed appropriate because "firms
lacking market power simply cannot rationally price their services [in contravention of the
Act]." Id. para. 88. The presumption of lawfulness is particularly pertinent because it demon-
strates that tariffs become effective without regulatory review or approval. The FCC will only
scrutinize tariffs when challenged under § 208 of the Act. Id.
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Act would not apply to them.6 3 Alternatively, the FCC could abstain from
application of certain Title II procedural requirements to nondominant com-
mon carriers, while maintaining the basic substantive requirements of just
and reasonable rates and nondiscrimination." The FCC tentatively con-
cluded that competition warranted removal of Title II regulation for com-
petitive or nearly competitive carriers lacking market power.65 In its Second
Report,66 the FCC adopted permissive forbearance67 for resellers of domestic
terrestrial services and permitted them to cancel tariffs with the FCC and
provide service on a private contract basis. 6' The FCC's Fourth Report69
and Fifth Report7° expanded the application of forbearance policies.
In 1985, the FCC boldly directed all "forborne carriers" to remove tariffs
filed with the FCC and conduct business with their customers solely on a
contract basis. 71 This changed the FCC's forbearance regulation from per-
missive to mandatory.72 At this juncture, the FCC effectively chose to forgo
any preliminary regulatory oversight for nondominant carriers.73 One
carrier, MCI, appealed the FCC's detariffing decision. 74 The United States
63. Title II of the Communications Act applies only to common carriers. 47 U.S.C.
§§ 201-26 (1988). Noncommon carriers are therefore not subject to its provisions, which in-
clude requirements to provide just and reasonable and nondiscriminatory rates. See 47 U.S.C.
§§ 201-05.
64. See MCI Telecom. Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1985); First Report,
supra note 8, at para. 16. Both the definitional and forbearance approaches to deregulation use
the touchstone of market power to determine whether application of the Title II requirements
is appropriate. Second Report, supra note 56, at para. 3. Under the definitional approach, a
carrier is considered a common carrier on the basis of its market power, while under the
forbearance approach, the absence of market power triggers relaxed Title II regulation. Id.
65. Further Notice, supra note 2, at para. 200. The FCC reasoned that the costs of certain
Title II regulations far exceeded the benefits and, thus, the public interest and the purpose of
the Act would be better served by forbearance. Id. at para. 198.
66. Second Report, supra note 56.
67. Rather than mandating or prescribing particular requirements for nondominant carri-
ers, the FCC's permissive forbearance policy permitted such carriers to forbear from certain
procedural requirements of Title II regarding entry, exit, licensing and tariffs. Id. para. 30.
68. Id. The FCC extended this policy to United States offshore resellers in its Third Re-
port. See Fourth Report, supra note 56, para. 3.
69. Fourth Report, supra note 56 (extending forbearance regulation to nondominant do-
mestic satellite resellers and specialized common carriers, including MCI and Sprint).
70. Fifth Report, supra note 56 (applying forbearance to interexchange affiliates of tele-
phone companies having no joint ownership of transmission facilities and all domestic satellite
service providers of interexchange digital electronic message services, except AT&T and the
local exchange carriers).
71. Sixth Report, supra note 56, at para. 2.
72. MCI Telecom. Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
73. Sixth Report, supra note 56, at para. 11 (asserting that FCC regulatory oversight will
be effectuated through the complaint process).
74. MCI, 765 F.2d at 1186. Opponents of mandatory detariffing complain that, inter alia,
customer information would be compromised and conversion to contracts would impose an
undue burden on carriers. Id. at 1189.
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Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the manda-
tory tariff cancellation by the FCC, vacated the Sixth Report, and remanded
the issue to the FCC.75 Yet, the FCC continues to insist that tariffs are
optional.7 6
Presently, under its forbearance policy, the FCC refrains from regulating
nondominant carriers and relies totally on the market. 77 Nondominant car-
riers are not required to file tariffs,78 and the FCC does not substantively
review their rates or tariffs prior to their taking effect. 79 The FCC only ex-
amines competitive carrier practices in the context of its adjudication of
75. Id. at 1195-96. The court found that the FCC lacked statutory authority to abolish
tariffs entirely in the face of § 203 of the Act, which required filing of rate schedules. Id. at
1195. While filing tariffs is permitted, however, it is purely voluntary and connotes no sanction
or review by the FCC of the rates or terms contained within the tariff. See, e.g., Sixth Report,
supra note 56, para. 20.
76. See AT&T Communications v. MCI Telecom. Corp., Memorandum Opinion & Order,
E-89-297, FCC 92-36 (Jan. 28, 1992) 6, para 13. The D.C. Circuit in MCI specifically declined
to rule on whether the FCC's actions, short of a complete ban, were reviewable. MCI, 765
F.2d at 1190-91 n.4.
In a subsequent ICC case, the Supreme Court held that the ICC could not eliminate its
tariffs where they were mandated by statute. See Maislin Indus. Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc.,
110 S. Ct. 2759, 2770 (1990). (holding that the ICC had no "authority to alter the well-estab-
lished statutory filed rate requirements"). Maislin narrowly held that courts cannot attribute
to Congress the intent to do that which it did not do. The Court found that the ICC's action
directly conflicted with its statutory mandate. Id. at 2770. The Maislin decision may not be
controlling with respect to the FCC, given the difference in statutory mandates of the FCC and
ICC. See In re Tariff Filing Requirements for Interstate Common Carriers, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, CC Docket No., 92-13, FCC 92-35 (Jan. 28, 1992). FCC forbearance policy rests
on the discretionary power provided in § 203(b)(2) of the Communications Act, which pro-
vides "[t]he Commission may, in its discretion and for good cause shown, modify any require-
ment made by or under the authority of this section either in particular instances or by general
order applicable to special circumstances." 47 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2) (1988). In MCI, the D.C.
Circuit limited the Commission's discretion under this provision, reasoning that the power to
modify was not tantamount to the power to eliminate requirements of the Act. MCI, 765 F.2d
at 1188. In contrast, the ICC forbearance policy rested not on explicit discretion within the
enabling statute, but on a provision of the Act which allowed the ICC to authorize rate levels.
Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 10701 (1988). Maislin involved deviation from rates
contained in the tariff, not ancillary limits on liability unrelated to rates. Maislin, 110 S. Ct. at
2763. In any event, consideration of the propriety of tariff exculpation clauses takes regulatory
structure as a given. Therefore, the issue raised by Maislin is a distinct question for considera-
tion in another case. This Comment focuses on the continued propriety of tariff liability limi-
tations in the current competitive environment where tariffs, whether required or not, are not
subject to Commission scrutiny and reflect the competitive posture of the carrier.
77. Fourth Report, supra note 56. The FCC substitutes competitive market forces for
regulation. "[C]ompetitive forces in the marketplace [will] serve to ensure, in the first instance,
carrier compliance with the [statutory] obligations imposed by [] Section 201(b)" of the Com-
munications Act. Second Report, supra note 56, at para. 21.
78. Second Report, supra note 56, at para. 12.
79. Id. The FCC reiterated that regulatory forbearance of nondominant carriers
"remov[es] affirmative requirements which require prior Commission approval, namely the
filing of tariffs and Section 214 applications" for a certificate to construct new facilities. Id.
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specific consumer-initiated complaints."0 Thus, under the new regulatory
regime, the FCC does not regulate rates, tariffs, practices, costs, investments,
entry, exit" or services.12 Therefore, all of the aspects of the comprehensive
scheme of regulation that applied traditionally to telephone utilities do not
apply to nondominant carriers.
8 3
II. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
Two jurisdictional issues interact in an appropriate reevaluation of the
tariff exculpation clauses. The threshold question is whether the FCC has
statutory authority to preempt state common law remedies. A closely re-
lated question is whether the decision to continue the exculpation policy
properly rests with the courts or with the FCC.
A. Federal Preemption and the Savings Clause
Congress has not preempted state common law remedies of general appli-
cability.8 4 Federal preemption occurs in three situations.8 5 First, Congress
can express the extent of federal preemption on the face of the federal stat-
ute.86 Second, preemption may be implied, without any express language,
where Congress intends to occupy an entire field and preclude supplemental
application of state law.8 7 Finally, state law may be preempted where it
actually conflicts with federal regulations.8" Federal preemption of state
80. Sixth Report, supra note 56, at para. 11 (noting that the FCC considers tariff issues
through the § 208 complaint process outlined in the Communications Act).
81. Barriers to entry and exit stem from § 214 of the Communications Act which requires
FCC approval to build or discontinue service. 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1988). The FCC found that a
"rigid adherence" to § 214 with respect to nondominant carriers was contrary to the Act's
purpose. Second Report, supra note 56, at para. 26.
82. Second Report, supra note 56, at paras. 3, 30.
83. In the Sixth Report, the FCC sought to eliminate tariffs precisely "to dispel any idea of
a Commission 'stamp of approval.'" Sixth Report, supra note 56, at para. 1.
84. West v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 923 F.2d 657, 660 (9th Cir. 1990), petition for cert.
filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3322 (U.S. Sept. 27, 1991) (No. 91-505).
85. Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467
U.S. 461, 469 (1984).
86. Id.; see also Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95-96 (1983) (stating Court
may ascertain Congressional intent from either explicit language of statute or implicit struc-
ture and purpose of statute).
87. Michigan Canners, 467 U.S. at 469 ("absen[t] express pre-emptive language, Congress
may indicate an intent to occupy an entire field of regulation, in which case the States must
leave all regulatory activity in that area to the Federal Government").
88. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) (finding
preemption where conflict makes compliance with both state and federal law impossible);
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 72-74 (1941) (holding state law preempted where it becomes
an obstacle to full execution of congressional purpose).
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law, because it impacts the balance of powers in our system of government,
must be carefully justified. 9
Administrative agencies may not preempt state laws unless such power is
expressly given by Congress in the enabling statutes.9" Administrative deci-
sions within an agency's delegated authority, however, have the same
preemptive effect as federal statutes. 9' Accordingly, in West v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc. ,92 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that state causes of action are not preempted solely because they impose
liability over and above that available under federal regulations. 93
Similarly, in Nader v. Allegheny Airlines Inc.,94 a passenger brought a
common law tort action based on fraud after he was bumped from an
overbooked flight.9 5 The overbooking policy was regulated by the Civil Aer-
onautics Board (CAB).9 6 CAB regulations required that liquidated damages
be awarded to bumped passengers. 97 Although CAB permitted overbook-
ing, such overbooking was not required.98 CAB's enabling statute contained
a savings clause that retained common law state remedies.9 9 Faced with an
express savings clause, the United States Supreme Court declined to hold
that state claims were preempted by the federal regulations."
89. Preemption analysis must "start with the assumption that the historic police powers
of the States were not to be superseded ... unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress." Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
90. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986).
91. See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 704-05 (1984) (holding FCC
regulations regarding cable carriage of distant signals preempted state ban on beer advertise-
ments); Florida Lime, 373 U.S. at 142-43 (holding federal preemption inevitable "where com-
pliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility"). But the Court
cautions that "[t]o infer pre-emption [sic] whenever an agency deals with a problem compre-
hensively is virtually tantamount to saying that whenever a federal agency decides to step into
a field, its regulations will be exclusive. (This is] inconsistent with the federal-state balance
embodied in [the] Supremacy Clause Jurisprudence." Hillsborough County v. Automated
Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 717 (1985) (citing Jones, 430 U.S. at 525). Therefore, courts
must look for special features of federal regulation that warrant preemption. Id. at 719.
92. 923 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1990), petition for cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3322 (U.S. Sept. 27,
1991) (No. 91-505).
93. Id. at 661; see also Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 301 (1976) (hold-
ing that a federal injunctive remedy supplements common law compensatory remedies).
94. 426 U.S. 290 (1976).
95. Id. at 293-95.
96. Id. at 294.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 300.
99. Id. at 296 n.7.
100. Id. at 302-03.
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Federal preemption relates to both unilateral liability exculpation and pri-
mary jurisdiction.'O° Specifically, the savings clause in the Communications
Act provides that federal regulation cannot alter or abridge state law reme-
dies. " 2 In addition, if the FCC lacks jurisdiction to override state law
causes of action and remedies, then the FCC cannot entertain primary juris-
diction to answer the legal question.0 3
B. Primary Jurisdiction
Primary jurisdiction allocates the adjudication of issues between the
courts and administrative agencies. ° Courts are guided by two principles
in applying primary jurisdiction: The importance of uniformity of regula-
tion and the need for specialized knowledge.'0 5 Courts defer to an agency
under primary jurisdiction when some special expertise of the agency per-
tains to an issue not traditionally within the competence of the judiciary.'06
101. In order for the FCC to exercise federal preemption, explicit authority must be found
in its congressional mandate embodied in the Communications Act. Louisiana Pub. Serv.
Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986).
102. 47 U.S.C. § 414 (1988). The Communications Act contains the following savings
clause: "Nothing in this chapter contained shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now
existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such
remedies." Id.
103. In Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, the Court made it clear that the FCC must demon-
strate that preemption of state law is within the scope of its congressionally delegated author-
ity. 476 U.S. at 374.
104. United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 63 (1956) (explaining that "[t]he
doctrine of primary jurisdiction.., is concerned with promoting proper relationships between
the courts and administrative agencies charged with particular regulatory duties"). In Profes-
sor Jaffe's landmark article on primary jurisdiction, he states:
Primary jurisdiction situations arise when the original jurisdiction of a court is being
invoked to decide the merits of a controversy: the facts, the law, the relief; and it is
held that the jurisdiction of the court either to decide one of the relevant issues or to
entertain the action at all has been superseded by agency jurisdiction.
Louis L. Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1037, 1037-38 (1964).
105. Transway Corp. v. Hawaiian Express Serv., 679 F.2d 1328, 1332 (9th Cir. 1982). The
court's decision to exercise jurisdiction should balance varying interests: the need for compre-
hensive review by the agency in regulating an industry to maintain statutorily mandated uni-
formity, Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 303-04 (1976), the need for agency
input as an expert on technical questions, id. at 304, and expeditious resolution of the case.
Early cases stress the need for uniformity; later cases tend to rely on the benefit of specialized
agency knowledge. Western Pacific, 352 U.S. at 64. By allowing the administrative agency to
pass initially on a question within its purview, the early courts reinforced desirable policies
respecting uniform national treatment by not rendering conflicting judgments. Id.
106. The Court further articulated the standard as it applied to a dispute with the Federal
Maritime Board: "[I]n cases raising issues of fact not within the conventional experience of
judges or cases requiring the exercise of administrative discretion, agencies created by Con-
gress for regulating the subject matter should not be passed over." Far East Conference v.
United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574 (1952). The precise function of primary jurisdiction is "to
guide a court in determining whether and when it should refrain from or postpone the exercise
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Thus, primary jurisdiction concerns the proper relationship between the
courts and administrative agencies1°7 and should only be used when the ex-
pertise of the agency would be advantageous, not merely as a means to dis-
pose of cases.10 8 A court need not defer to an agency on a purely legal
question.109 Consequently, courts have declined to assert primary jurisdic-
tion where application of the facts before the court to the general rule as-
serted in the case was mechanical.110
When the reasonableness of a tariff is at issue, the question is squarely
within the agency's primary jurisdiction.' Complex cost allocation and
of its own jurisdiction so that an [administrative] agency may first answer some question
presented." KENNETH C. DAVIS, 4 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22.1, at 81 (2d ed.
1983); see also Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907) (annunciating
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and holding primary jurisdiction appropriately in the ICC
when court's common law authority was in direct conflict with ICC ratemaking power). Pri-
mary jurisdiction applies to claims that, although originally cognizable in the courts, require
the special competence of a regulatory body envisioned by the regulatory scheme. Western
Pacific, 352 U.S. at 64. Primary jurisdiction chiefly applies to regulated industries. Jaffe, supra
note 104, at 1040. "It is not merely the presence of expertness, but the wide-reaching and
systematic character of agency regulation which tends to choke out the normal jurisdiction of
the courts." Id. at 1040-41. Absent pervasive regulation, the courts more liberally exercise
jurisdiction. Id. at 1041.
107. Western Pacific, 352 U.S. at 63. The doctrine does not imply a belief that the agency
is more competent than the court, but rather recognizes that when confronted with an issue
within the particular expertise of the agency, the court may benefit from agency insight. See
id. at 63-64. In Clark Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1373, 1381-82 (D. Del. 1985), the
United States District Court of Delaware reiterated that primary jurisdiction should only be
utilized if an agency's expertise would be helpful in making a final decision. Id.
108. Clark Oil, 609 F. Supp. at 1381-82. No fixed formula determines when primary juris-
diction is appropriate; rather courts must discern, in each case, whether the rationales support-
ing the doctrine will be served by agency referral. Western Pacific, 352 U.S. at 64. Because the
decision to exercise primary jurisdiction depends on the specific issues and facts in question,
see Jaffe, supra note 104, at 1037, courts must evaluate the prudence of referral using a flexible
case-by-case approach. See Western Pacific, 352 U.S. at 64. Thus, although no fixed factors
exist to determine when primary jurisdiction is appropriate, four factors are often considered
when courts decide whether to resort to primary jurisdiction: (1) whether the issue is within
the conventional wisdom of judges, (2) whether a question lies at the heart of an agency's
discretion or requires agency expertise, (3) whether the possibility of inconsistent rulings exist,
and (4) whether prior application was made to the agency. Clark Oil, 609 F. Supp. at 1382.
109. Clark Oil, 609 F. Supp. at 1382.
110. Transway Corp. v. Hawaiian Express Serv., 679 F.2d 1328, 1332 (9th Cir. 1982). The
rationale for judicial decision, without prior agency referral, is self-evident when application of
the issue is mechanical, because no special expertise is required. Id.
111. Western Pacific, 352 U.S. at 69; Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth. v. Valley
Freight Sys., 856 F.2d 546, 550 (3d Cir. 1988). In Western Pacific, the Court determined that
a question of whether napalm gel constituted an incendiary bomb subject to higher tariffed
rates was properly within the exclusive primary jurisdiction of the ICC. The Court reasoned
that tariff construction that requires special knowledge is within the agency's primary jurisdic-
tion. 352 U.S. at 63. The Court stated that:
[W]here words in a tariff are used in a peculiar or technical sense, and where extrin-
sic evidence is necessary to determine their meaning or proper application, so that
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accounting problems must be solved in the initial calculation of tariff
rates.'l2 Thus, the reasonableness of rates should first be adjudicated by the
agency."1 3 Although not all tariff construction matters are properly referred
to the regulating agency," 4 where tariff construction and questions of tariff
reasonableness are inextricably intertwined, primary jurisdiction is
proper. 1 5
In Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co. v. River Terminals Corp.,' 16 the
Supreme Court examined whether primary jurisdiction was appropriate for
consideration of the public policy behind a tariff exculpation clause." 7 The
Supreme Court found that, although the ultimate determination was one for
the courts, it remained appropriate to seek advice from the agency 18 when
the regulation was pervasive."1 In Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc. 120 the
Court declined to refer the question to the governing agency under primary
jurisdiction or to dismiss the state tort actions.
1 21
A number of lower courts have applied the Supreme Court's reasoning.
In MCI Communications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,122
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that techni-
cal issues were properly referred to the FCC under primary jurisdiction.
1 23
"the enquiry [sic] is essentially one of fact and of discretion in technical matters,"
then the issue of tariff application must first go to the Commission.
Id. at 66 (quoting Great N. Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 291 (1922)).
112. Cost allocation is the process of determining which rates should recover which costs
of the network. For example, since both local and long distance calls are completed over the
wire which extends to the customer's phone, the cost allocation process determines what por-
tion of the cost of that wire is recoverable in the rates for those services.
113. Western Pacific, 352 U.S. at 69. However, "Congress has granted and confirmed the
original jurisdiction of the courts to enforce carrier rules and tariffs partly in order to make
available.., convenient federal and state judicial forums. The function of interpreting specific
tariffs is not central to carrier regulation." Jaffe, supra note 104, at 1044.
114. When prior agency opinion "has already construed the particular tariff at issue or has
clarified the factors underlying it," the court may construe the tariff without reference to the
agency. Western Pacific, 352 U.S. at 69. In many cases, construing the tariff does not involve
complicated questions of cost allocation. Id.
115. Id.
116. 360 U.S. 411 (1959).
117. Id. at 426.
118. Specifically, agency advice with respect to the "relevant economic and other facts
which the administrative agency ... is peculiarly well equipped ... to evaluate" could assist
courts in their decisionmaking. Id. at 420.
119. Id. at 418. The Court reasoned that a common carrier, at all times subject to regula-
tory control, could not abuse the tariff provisions. Id.
120. 426 U.S. 290 (1976).
121. Id. at 304-06. The court reasoned that the action did not turn on tariff reasonableness
and therefore did not require agency expertise, id. at 305, and that the tariffs provided for a
resort to common law remedies. Id. at 306.
122. 496 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1974).
123. Id. at 223.
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The court found it unclear whether previous FCC orders addressed the tech-
nical issues before the court.'24 The court also sought to avoid conflict with
the FCC in resolution of the issues. 125 In contrast, in In re Long Distance
Telecommunications Litigation,126 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit refused to refer state law claims to the FCC because they
were within the conventional expertise ofjudges. 127 Similarly, primary juris-
diction is not invoked when the issue involves the jurisdiction of the FCC
over a service.128
The issue of tariff liability is usually decided in state cases without prior
agency referral.' 29 Cases are only rarely referred to state regulatory agen-
cies. 130 State court reluctance to refer decisions on tariff liability to state
regulators supports the conclusion that decisions on tariff liability limitations
are within the purview of the courts. 3'
Thus, while the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is a matter of judicial
discretion, referral is primarily based on the expertise of the administrative
agency with respect to an issue before the court. 32 Moreover, judges tend to
exercise primary jurisdiction discretion in regulated industries, where the
court is reluctant to interfere with an agency's regulation of an industry.'33
Finally, purely legal questions or questions of policy within the conventional
experience of judges are not referred to the agency for decision.1
3 4
124. Id. at 220-21 (referring case to FCC for decision on a technical interconnection issue).
125. Id. at 221. The court noted that the case was appropriately referred to the FCC be-
cause it would have required the court to make a "judicial determination of the scope of per-
missible competition between the specialized carriers." Id. at 222. If the question framed by
the court goes to the heart of agency regulation, the court may refer to the agency because the
question involves technical or policy considerations beyond the court's ordinary competence
and within the agency's field of expertise. Id. at 220.
126. 831 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1987).
127. Id. at 633. The court, however, referred claims based on the Communications Act to
the Commission. Id. at 631.
128. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth. v. Valley Freight Sys., 856 F.2d 546, 549-50
(3d Cir. 1988). In RCA Global Communications, Inc. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 521 F.
Supp. 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York declined to apply primary jurisdiction because the essential factual and legal issues upon
which the plaintiff's claims rested had been definitively resolved by the reviewing court. Id.
129. See, e.g., supra notes 44-45, and accompanying text.
130. See infra note 244.
131. State courts have repeatedly found liability issues within the purview of the courts.
See supra notes 44-45.
132. Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc. 426 U.S. 290, 304 (1976).
133. Jaffe, supra note 104, at 1040-41.
134. Clark Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 609 F. Supp 1373, 1382 (D. Del. 1985); Southwestern
Sugar & Molasses Co. v. River Terminals Corp., 360 U.S. 411, 420 (1959).
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III. RICHMAN BRO&S RECORDS v. US. SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS CO.
The 1920s doctrine of liability exculpation is directly challenged in Rich-
man Bros. Records v. U.S. Sprint Communications Co. 135 In this case, Rich-
man seeks reevaluation of the long-standing and outdated liability limits
pertaining to customers of nondominant carriers and applied through volun-
tary tariffs. 136 Such voluntary tariffs impose unilateral provisions on cus-
tomers in a competitive market without providing them with notice or an
opportunity to reject the limitations.
Richman filed suit against Sprint' 37 for negligence, tortious interference
with business, failing to properly install new phone lines, and interrupting its
phone order business through the year-end holiday season. 138 On reconsid-
eration, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey va-
cated its prior Summary Judgment decision, 139 and transferred the case to
the FCC for adjudication. 1" The district court reasoned that because Sprint
files tariffs with the FCC, the issue should be referred to the agency under
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.' 4
Richman appealed the primary jurisdiction ruling to the Third Circuit' 4 2
on the grounds that liability limitations, voluntarily filed with the FCC in
Sprint's tariffs, do not give the FCC jurisdiction to decide Richman's com-
mon law tort claims. 1 3 The Third Circuit dismissed for lack of appellate
jurisdiction on the grounds that the district court action was a not a final
action subject to appellate review."' Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court de-
135. Richman Bros. Records v. U.S. Sprint Communications Co., No. 88-4908 (D.N.J.
filed June 22, 1990), appeal dismissed, Richman Bros. Records v. U.S. Sprint Communications
Co., Nos. 90-5607, 90-5657 (3d Cir. Dec. 31, 1991), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3879 (U.S. June
29, 1992).
136. Richman Bros. Records v. U.S. Sprint Communications Co., Nos. 90-5607, 90-5657,
slip op. at 4 (3d Cir. Dec. 31, 1991), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3879 (U.S. June 29, 1992).
137. This action was initiated by U.S. Sprint in Kansas to recover nearly $58,000 from
Richman for unpaid bills. Shortly thereafter, Richman filed this action in New Jersey state
court. Both cases were consolidated and transferred to the District Court for New Jersey. Id.
at 5-6.
138. Outbound service was disrupted, after the switch to Sprint service, from October 1987
through January 1988. Richman Bros., No. 88-4908, slip op. at 4 (D.N.J. filed June 22, 1990).
139. Richman Bros. Records v. U.S. Sprint Communications Co., No. 88-4908, slip op.
(D.N.J. filed April 6, 1990), vacated, Richman Bros., No. 88-4908, slip op. (D.N.J. filed June
22, 1990).
140. Richman Bros., No. 88-4908, slip op. at 2-3 (D.N.J. filed June 22, 1990).
141. Id. at 3, 17.
142. Richman Bros. Records v. U.S. Sprint Communications Co., Nos. 90-5607, 90-5657
(3d Cir. Dec. 31, 1991), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3879 (U.S. June 29, 1992).
143. Richman argued that the question raised does not require the specialized expertise of
the FCC because the claims arise under state common law. Id. at 18, 38.
144. Id. at 5. The court held that the primary jurisdiction issue was not distinct and imme-
diately appealable separate from the tariff issue. Id. at 41-42. Thus, under the opinion, an
appeal of the primary jurisdiction is inappropriate until after the agency renders a decision.
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nied Richman's petition for certorari. 45 The district court transferred the
case to the FCC for adjudication under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
stands.1 4 6 Thus, this issue will proceed before the FCC under the District
Court's transfer action. 147
Richman is significant because it challenges the assumptions of the 1920s
doctrine of unilateral liability exculpation in the modem era of deregula-
tion.' 48 Both parties have an enormous stake in the outcome: Sprint would
be subject to far greater liability under an adverse ruling 49 and Richman
would recover damages for the considerable financial harm sustained by loss
of business in its busiest selling season.' 50
Richman asks whether policy decisons made pursuant to the Communica-
tions Act can legitimately preempt state negligence and fraud claims. T"
Richman believes the Communications act specifically preserves these ac-
tions in state court. More importantly, Richman questions the appropriate-
ness of continued routine application of the exculpation doctrine in the
competitive service environment.
In contrast, Sprint maintains that as a tariff-filing common carrier, and
under the "tariff as law" doctrine, 15 2 any claims arising from its tariffed serv-
Richman's petition for reconsideration en banc, on the grounds that the transfer under pri-
mary jurisdiction was an appealable action, was denied.
145. Richman Bros., 60 U.S.L.W. 3879 (U.S. June 29, 1992).
146. Richman Bros., 90-5607, 90-5657, slip. op. at 5 (3d Cir. Dec. 31, 1991). Richman
unsuccessfully argued that, in light of the Communications Act savings clause, this issue
should be decided by the courts at the same time as the common law tort and contract issues.
See Jaffe, supra note 104, at 1038 (noting that jurisdiction lies with the court for common law
contract or tort issues).
147. Interestingly, a typical referral under primary jurisdiction applies only to those issues
suited to Commission expertise. The case is then concluded in the court that originally stipu-
lated the issues to the Commission. However, in this case, the district court appears to have
transferred the entire case to the Commission. Thus, if the tariff liability issue is decided for
Richman, the Commission, not the court, would be faced with deciding the legal issues of state
contract and tort claims. Such decision-making power is completely outside the Commission's
jurisdiction.
148. See, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Priester, 276 U.S. 252 (1928); Western Union Tel.
Co. v. Esteve Bros., 256 U.S. 566 (1921).
149. If Sprint's liability is not limited, it faces consequential, treble, and punitive damages
under New Jersey state law. Richman Bros., Nos. 90-5607, 90-5657, slip op. at 6 (3d Cir. Dec.
31, 1991).
150. Richman Bros. Records v. U.S. Sprint Communications Co., No. 88-4908, slip op. at
6 (D.N.J. June 22, 1990), appeal dismissed, Richman Bros. Records v. U.S. Sprint Communi-
cations Co., Nos. 90-5607, 90-5657 (3d Cir. Dec. 31, 1991), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3879
(U.S. June 29, 1992).
151. Richman Bros., Nos. 90-5607, 90-5657, slip op. at 18 (3d Cir. Dec. 31, 1991).
152. Stand Buys, Ltd. v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 646 F. Supp. 36, 37 (E.D. Mich. 1986)
(acknowledging that a properly filed tariff is the law regarding claims for damages).
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ices are governed by the provisions of its lawfully filed tariff.' 53 Sprint con-
tends, therefore, that its liability is limited by the tariff provisions.' 54
Moreover, Sprint argues that there is no preemption issue because the plain-
tiffs are entitled to bring the cause of action in a state court., 55 However,
Sprint claims the right to use its tariff as a defense to limit its damages.'
56
IV. THE NEED FOR CHANGE IN THE MODERN COMPETITIVE
ENVIRONMENT
Analysis of the arguments in Richman must focus on three issues. First, a
threshold consideration is whether the Communications Act preempts state
common law tort and contract claims.' 57 Second, an important policy ques-
tion is whether tariffs filed by nondominant, deregulated competitive carriers
should appropriately exclude liability for negligence and serve as a defense to
153. Richman Bros., Nos. 90-5607, 90-5657, slip op. at 6 (3d Cir. Dec. 31, 1991). Sprint
also asserts that the issues involve "far reaching policy concerns" that should be decided by the
FCC. See, e.g., Richman Bros., No. 88-4908, slip op. at 18 (D.N.J. June 22, 1990).
154. Sprint's tariff provides:
It shall be the obligation of the subscriber to notify the Carrier of any interruption in
service. Before giving such notice, the subscriber shall ascertain that the trouble is
not being caused by any action or omission of the subscriber, not within his control,
or not in wiring or equipment connected to the terminal of the Carrier.
U.S. Sprint Tariff F.C.C. No. 2, § 3.14 (effective Aug. 1, 1986). Thereafter, the tariff limits
liability as follows:
The liability of the Carrier for damages arising out of mistakes, omissions, interrup-
tions, delays, errors or defects in the transmission occurring in the course of furnish-
ing service, channels or other facilities and not caused by the negligence of the
subscriber, commences upon activation of service and in no event exceeds an amount
equivalent to the charges the Carrier would make to subscriber for the period of
service during which such ... occur.
U.S. Sprint Tariff F.C.C. No. 2, § 3.4.1 (effective June 1, 1987).
155. Brief for Appellee/Cross-Appellant, Richman Bros., Nos. 90-5607, 90-5657, at 22 (3d
Cir. filed Oct. 31, 1990).
156. Id. at 23. Sprint argues that the rights of carriers cannot be enlarged by contract or
tort. See Keogh v. Chicago Nw. Ry., 260 U.S. 156, 163 (1922) ("The rights as defined by the
tariff cannot be varied or enlarged by either contract or tort of the carrier."). Statutorily re-
quired tariffs set legal rates which cannot be varied by carriers, see Arizona Grocery Co. v.
Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 284 U.S. 370, 384 (1932), and such tariffs bind both
carriers and shippers with the force of law. See Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co. v. River
Terminals Corp., 360 U.S. 411, 414 n.4. (1959). Sprint further maintains that, although filed
tariffs give sufficient notice, Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 306 n. 14 (1976), a
tariff required to be filed by law is not simply a contract, but operates as law. Carter v. Ameri-
can Tel. & Tel. Co., 365 F.2d 486, 496 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1008 (1967).
Therefore, according to Sprint, this case does not involve federal preemption of state law be-
cause tariffs are the law governing the relationship between carriers and subscribers to their
services. Brief for Appellee/Cross Appellant, Richman Bros., Nos. 90-5607, 90-5657, at 22 (3d
Cir. filed Oct. 31, 1990).
157. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1988); 47 U.S.C. § 414 (1988); see also infra text accom-
panying notes 187-89.
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damages actions brought under state law. 5 ' Third, a final concern is the
appropriate forum for the decision, either the courts or the administrative
agency, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.' 59
A. Preemption
The initial inquiry is whether Congress expressly preempted state causes
of action in the Communications Act of 1934."° The Communications Act
does not expressly override state law. 16 ' No provision of the Communica-
tions Act preempts application of state tort law.' 62 In fact, the Act specifi-
cally preserves state law remedies. 163  The savings clause of the
Communications Act demonstrates that Congress explicitly intended to ex-
empt state remedies from federal preemption.'
64
Preemption can be implied by Congress when a field has been fully occu-
pied by the federal legislation,' 65 when the state law is fundamentally incon-
sistent with Congressional purposes, 166 or where it is impossible to complywith both the state and federal laws. 167 In order to find implicit preemption,
158. See infra text accompanying notes 190-94.
159. See infra text accompanying notes 234-48.
160. Congress may expressly preempt state law. Express preemption by Congress is given
"by so stating in explicit terms on the face of the statute." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the
United States v. Abrams, 899 F.2d 1315, 1318 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1122
(1991) (quoting Envtl. Encapsulating Corp. v. City of New York, 855 F.2d 48, 53 (2d Cir.
1988)).
161. See 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (indicating that the Communications Act reserves for the
states a considerable sphere of regulatory autonomy that may not be impaired by the federal
government); see also Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 371 (1986) (con-
templating the argument that the legislative history to the Communications Act reveals Con-
gressional intent to preserve state regulation powers).
162. The Court's decision in Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., under an identical savings
clause in the Federal Aviation Act, makes it clear that Congress did not expressly preempt
state law claims. 426 U.S. 290, 306 (1976). However, a footnote in Nader commented that if
the exculpatory clauses were detailed in a tariff, the court could apply "settled principles of
tort law [to] determine [iQ the tariff provided sufficient notice." Id. at 306 n. 14.
163. See 47 U.S.C. § 414 (1988). In an analogous case, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit recently ruled that under a provision in the Federal Aviation Act, Con-
gress has not preempted state common law remedies of general applicability when applied to
interstate airline carriers. West v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 923 F.2d 657, 661 (9th Cir. 1990),
petition for cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3322 (U.S. Sept. 27, 1991) (No. 91-505). The pertinent
provision in the Federal Aviation Act reads: "Nothing contained in this [Act] shall in any way
abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of
this [Act] are in addition to such remedies." Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1506 (1988).
164. See 47 U.S.C. § 414.
165. Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467
U.S. 461, 469 (1984); see also supra note 87.
166. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); see also supra note 88.




the court must conclude that the legislature intended that the federal law
occupy the specific field covered by state law168 and that the federal scheme
of regulation "left no room" for state laws. 169 The Communications Act left
significant power to the states in regulating telecommunications, 7 ' indicat-
ing conclusively that Congress did not intend to occupy the entire regulatory
field.17 Moreover, at issue in Richman are state common law tort, fraud,
and contract claims.17 2 The Communications Act does not purport to oc-
cupy these traditionally common law fields.173 Congressional legislation in
an area traditionally occupied by states faces a strong presumption against
federal preemption. '7 4
The comprehensiveness of federal regulation is not in itself enough to sup-
port preemption.17 5 Merely because additional liability attends a state cause
of action does not make it automatically susceptible to federal preemp-
tion176 A dominant federal interest alone is insufficient to overcome the
presumption against preemption,' 77 particularly where state law does not
seek to regulate the entities affected and has only a tangential, indirect effect
on services subject to federal regulation. 178 Moreover, federal preemption is
not assumed simply because the telephone provider is subject to state laws of
general applicability.179 The savings clause also forestalls the conclusion
that the Communications Act implicitly preempted state law.180
168. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100 (1989).
169. Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985)
(quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
170. 47 U.S.C. 152(b) (1988); see Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374
(1986).
171. This conclusion is self-evident in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Louisiana
Pub. Sery. Comm 'n, since regulation of telephone companies has been split between federal and
state regulators and since the Communications Act regulates only interstate communications.
See 476 U.S. at 374.
172. Richman Bros. Records v. U.S. Sprint Communications Co., Nos. 90-5607, 90-5657,
slip op. at 6 (3d Cir. Dec. 31, 1991).
173. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 152(b).
174. Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1985);
West v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 923 F.2d 657, 659 (9th Cir. 1990), petition for cert. filed, 60
U.S.L.W. 3322 (U.S. Sept. 27, 1991) (No. 91-505).
175. Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 717-18.
176. "[S]tate causes of action are not pre-empted [sic] solely because they impose liability
over and above that authorized by federal law .... " California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S.
93, 105 (1989).
177. Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 715.
178. West, 923 F.2d at 660; cf Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 300 (1976)
(noting that impact of tort liability on rates would be incidental).
179. Cf West, 923 F.2d at 660 ("The fact that this duty is applicable to airlines as well as
the general public does not invoke federal preemption.").
180. By explicitly preserving state law remedies, the plain meaning of the Act belies im-
plicit preemption. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 414 (1988).
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Finally, state law is preempted where it actually conflicts with federal reg-
ulation by impossibility or purpose. 8'1 For the FCC to preempt state reme-
dies, it must demonstrate that state imposed liability would create a direct
conflict with carriers' federal regulatory obligations or would hinder the im-
plementation of federal policies.'12 In the instant case, state common law
liability would not render compliance with both state and federal law impos-
sible. 183 Therefore, because liability awards would not inhibit carriers from
compliance with federal regulations,' 8 4 congressional purpose would not be
defeated by application of tort claims. 185 Imposing common law negligence
and tort liability on nondominant, competitive carriers is consistent with
the FCC's deregulatory goals because it allows the marketplace, not regula-
tion, to ensure reasonable rates and practices for non-monopoly telephone
companies. 116
The Communications Act expressly prohibits the preemption of state
claims.'" 7 Neither Congress, under the Communications Act, nor the FCC,
which is not so empowered, has preempted state common law remedies.' 8 8
Indeed, in the face of an express savings clause, tariffs filed pursuant to the
Act by any carrier may not "abridge or alter" state common law reme-
dies. ' 9 Given this conclusion, there is no reason to extend the benefit of
limited liability, applicable in the past to pervasively regulated monopoly
carriers, to the significantly differing circumstances of deregulated competi-
tive carriers.
B. Tariff Regulation and Nondominant Carriers
Given the facts in Richman, the issue of unilateral tariff exculpation for
nondominant carriers is thrown into sharp relief against the policies behind
181. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963);
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 57 (1941); see also supra note 91 (discussing conflicts of
impossibility or purpose).
182. See Florida Lime, 373 U.S. at 142-43.
183. See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 105 (1989) (stating that state laws that
simply impose additional liability do not render compliance with federal laws impossible).
184. See, e.g., West v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 923 F.2d 657, 661 (9th Cir. 1990), petition
for cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3322 (U.S. Sept. 27, 1991); Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426
U.S. 290, 300 (1976).
185. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988) (setting forth the purpose of
the Communications Act).
186. See Hearings, supra note 9, at 1083 ("It is one thing ... to say that we do not want a
rate base regulated utility taking undue risks with the public's money. It is quite another thing
to say that we should prohibit independent entrepreneurs from risking their money by law or
regulation.").





liability limits."19 Cases upholding limited liability tariffs on the basis of
inherent regulatory power are inapposite here.19 First, the FCC has indi-
cated its reluctance to regulate nondominant carriers such as Sprint. 192 Ac-
cordingly, the market, not regulation, sets prices. 193 Second, the FCC has
refrained from expressly or implicitly approving the tariff and from indicat-
ing that limited liability is an inherent part of the rate.
1 94
1. Deregulation and the Myth of Inherent Regulatory Oversight
Since the mid-1980s, Sprint has been a nondominant competitive carrier
which the FCC expressly forbears from regulating.19 Under the Competi-
tive Carrier regime, the marketplace, not rate and service regulation, main-
tains reasonable, nondiscriminatory rates and practices for nondominant
carriers that lack market power. 196 Accordingly, no court decision has ever
second-guessed the market by exempting deregulated telephone companies
from common law liability. 97 The reasoning underlying the 1920s doctrine
does not apply to nondominant carriers whose rates, tariffs, and services are
not subject to regulatory scrutiny or control." 8
This change in regulatory approach by the FCC, exemplified by the Com-
petitive Carrier decisions, demonstrates that Sprint, as a nondominant car-
rier, enjoys FCC forbearance from regulation of rates, services, profits and
190. See supra notes 135-56 and accompanying text.
191. Cases relying on inherent regulatory power assume active oversight and policy consid-
eration by the overseeing regulatory body. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. SCM Corp., 600 F.
Supp. 493, 496 (D.D.C. 1984) (holding that decisions to limit liability are entrusted to the
Public Service Commission); Pilot Indus. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 495 F. Supp. 356,
361 (D.S.C. 1979) (recognizing that liability limitations are a function of ratesetting which is
"totally regulated").
192. See, e.g., Sixth Report, supra note 56. Sprint, while held to the requirements of Title
II, is not pervasively regulated. Second Report, supra note 56, at para. 21.
193. Second Report, supra note 56, at para. 17.
194. Voluntary tariffs, written and filed by competitive carriers, automatically go into effect
without FCC approval. See, e.g., Sixth Report, supra note 56, at para. 1.
195. Sprint is often referred to in the context of competition as a nondominant inter-
exchange competitor. Answer of U.S. Sprint at 7, U.S. Sprint Communications Co. v. AT&T
Communications, F.C.C. File No. E-90-113 (filed Apr. 18, 1990).
196. Second Report, supra note 56, at paras. 3-5.
197. In the context of the instant case, Sprint strenuously denies its deregulated status, but
the FCC considers such carriers deregulated, see Further Notice, supra note 2, at para. 3, as do
the courts. See, e.g., MCI Telecom. Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186, 1188 (6th Cir. 1985).
Moreover, in a letter from U.S. Sprint to its customers, Sprint referred to itself as deregulated.
Reply Brief for Appellant at 19-20, Richman Bros. Records v. U.S. Sprint Communications
Co., Nos. 90-5607, 90-5657 (3d Cir. filed Dec. 3, 1990).
198. The FCC's own inclination is to let the market regulate the relations between carriers
and customers. Second Report, supra note 56, at paras. 12, 17.
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costs and is thus not a pervasively regulated monopoly.199 In fact, Sprint's
rates and tariffs are simply not regulated. 200 Rather, Sprint is an essentially
deregulated common carrier permitted to enter and exit markets of its
choice, set prices without regulators looking over its shoulder, and avoid
most of the constraints of traditional public utility regulation.2 ° ' Sprint is
not required to file tariffs,2"2 and those that are voluntarily filed are not sub-
ject to regulatory scrutiny before they become effective.2 °3 Similarly,
Sprint's rates are not "approved" by the Commission, and consequently it is
unnecessary for Sprint to cost-justify its rates or submit supporting economic
studies or analysis for its proposed rate changes. 2° Finally, Sprint's profits
are a function of the marketplace and are not established in administrative
rate cases or subject to price caps, 205 nor do its costs and investments require
regulatory approval.2 °6 In contrast, because of their market power, domi-
nant carriers remain subject to these requirements in order to protect captive
customers who have no competitive alternative.20 7
2. Cost of Judgments and Marketplace Regulation
The cost of judgments rationale for limited liability is similarly inapplica-
ble in the instant case. 20 8 The rationale-to protect ratepayers from the cost
of judgments imposed by litigation-does not apply when there are competi-
tive alternatives for service.20 9 If the customer chooses not to pay inflated
199. The Commission distinguishes between the role of regulation for dominant and
nondominant carriers:
[Plublic utility regulation ... sees far beyond fixing prices, and includes control over
market entry and exit, as well as investment decisions, determination of allowable
rates of return, and review of all rates and practices. Generally, such regulation is
administered by an autonomous government agency with extensive investigating
powers. This is, of course, the same form of regulation which this Commission exer-
cises under Title II of the Act.
Further Notice, supra note 2, at para. 19; see also id. at para. 20 (describing traditional public
utility rate regulation).
200. The FCC does not purport to regulate nondominant carriers' tariffs. Sixth Report,
supra note 56, at para. 1. It is significant that Sprint is comfortable asserting that its tariffs are
nonbinding and argues that it is free to set rates through individual contractual bargains that
are outside its tariffs. Answer of U.S. Sprint at 7, U.S. Sprint Communications Co. v. AT&T
Communications, F.C.C. File No. E-90-113 (filed Apr. 18, 1990).
201. Second Report, supra note 56, at para. 3.
202. Sixth Report, supra note 56, at para. 1.
203. Second Report, supra note 56, at para. 5.
204. Cf. FCC Tariffs Rule, 47 C.F.R. § 61.38 (1991) (specifying voluminous tariff support
filings required by dominant carriers).
205. Fourth Report, supra note 56.
206. Second Report, supra note 56, at para. 21.
207. Id.
208. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
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rates, which reflect judgments against the company, then they can seek ser-
vice from other competitive providers.2"' This is not so with monopoly car-
riers.21 In the days when all service was obtained from a single carrier, the
possibility that the carrier could pass on the cost of judgments through stan-
dard rates-of-return meant that all ratepayers would bear the burden of in-
creased costs imposed by one customer's lawsuit.212
Sprint may set its rates for service as it sees fit and within the constraints
placed on it by the market. 13 Indeed, the regulatory purpose for promoting
reasonable rates has been left to the market.214 Voluntary tariffs are incon-
sistent with the "tariff as law" rule of old.21 5 There is no automatic pass-
through on judgments to captive ratepayers in a competitive environment.21 6
Rather, the marketplace determines the prices of competitive carriers. 217
The market price should reflect the cost of service; service that is of a partic-
ular quality will attract customers at specified prices.218  By removing the
judgment factor from the pricing decision, courts would distort the market
for services.219
Sprint argues that dominant carriers would not be subject to the same
liability and therefore would be able to undercut price. Ultimately, these
dominant carriers would drive competitors out of the business, directly con-
travening the Commission's objective of market competition. 220 This argu-
ment is flawed because it ignores the fact that dominant carriers are still
regulated as to price and service quality.22  Regulatory oversight should ad-
just requirements on dominant carriers to assure a level playing field. Carri-
ers will either be subjected to liability in competitive markets or be required
to meet strict regulatory standards on quality of service in order to minimize
210. See Second Report, supra note 56, at para. 21.
211. See supra note 36.
212. See Professional Answering Serv. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 565 A.2d 55,
64-65 (D.C. App. 1989); Pilot Indus. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 495 F. Supp. 356, 361
(D.S.C. 1979).
213. Fourth Report, supra note 56.
214. Second Report, supra note 56, at para. 21.
215. See Stand Buys, Ltd. v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 646 F. Supp. 36, 37 (E.D. Mich.
1986). The inconsistency arises because this rule would allow carriers to voluntarily bind cus-
tomers with the force of law. Id.
216. In a competitive market, customers are not captives to any particular provider be-
cause they can always change to a competitor. See, e.g., Fowler, supra note 9, at 146.
217. Second Report, supra note 56, at para. 21.
218. See Hearings, supra note 9, at 1080 (discussing the relationship between price and
customer satisfaction).
219. Fowler, supra note 9, at 150 n.6. "In a free market economy, where individual con-
sumers express their preferences among competing goods through free choice in their
purchases, price becomes the principle arbiter of relative values." Id. at 149.
220. Id. at 157-58.
221. Further Notice, supra note 2, at para. 19.
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the number of judgments imposed on them.222 This regulatory oversight of
dominant carriers is a substitute for the market which operates to regulate
nondominant carriers."'
3. Competitive Alternatives and National Uniformity
Finally, with respect to national uniformity, the Communications Act sav-
ings clause specifically allows common law recovery.22 4 This fundamentally
undermines the uniformity rationale applied in the 1920s.225 Deregulation
of competitive carriers conflicts with cases requiring uniform rates.
22 6
Under the rationales of the early cases, either the FCC or another agency
regulated public utilities, and these agencies actually reviewed and approved
the tariffs and rates. 227 Esteve and Priester involved a regulated telegraph
utility and not competitive telecommunications carriers.22 The rationale of
cases permitting unilateral tariff liability limitations is inapplicable outside
the framework of regulated, monopoly public utilities, where judicial defer-
ence to pervasive regulatory oversight of carrier rates and practices can be
justified.
2 29
222. See, e.g., id., at para. 159 (indicating that the "full panoply of ... regulations" will
continue to apply to AT&T as the dominant carrier).
223. Fowler, supra note 9, at 150-51.
224. 47 U.S.C. § 414 (1988).
225. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Esteve Bros., 256 U.S. 566, 572 (1921).
226. See supra notes 31-43 and accompanying text. A competitive marketplace assumes
price differentials. See supra note 219. Moreover, decisions at the state level clearly evidence
disparate treatment of consumer claims. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. Given
the changes in industry structure, see supra note 53, the simplest approach to equitable treat-
ment is to place the decision in the hands of consumers through contractual bargains. See
infra pt. IV(D).
227. Although Sprint points out that Western Union had competition from ITT, the Court
makes clear that Western Union's rates were authorized and approved by the ICC. Esteve, 256
U.S. at 571.
228. Id.; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Priester, 276 U.S. 252 (1928). Additionally, in review-
ing the legislative history of the Communications Act, the FCC noted that Western Union
held over 75 percent market share, and together with ITT, they controlled 99.9 percent of all
telegraph and cable revenues. Further Notice, supra note 2, at paras. 44-46.
229. This reasoning was used in state cases dealing with yellow page directory services.
See, e.g., Morgan v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 466 So. 2d 107 (Ala. 1985) (holding exculpatory
clause in directory agreement invalid as against public policy where relationship is primarily
contractual); Tannock v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 515 A.2d 814 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1986) (holding yellow pages contract was a contract of adhesion), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
537 A.2d 1307 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988); Discount Fabric House of Racine, Inc. v.
Wisconsin Tel. Co., 345 N.W.2d 417 (Wis. 1984) (holding the threat of rate increases as a
result of being held negligently responsible is an invalid reason to limit liability applicable to
telephone company yellow pages listing). But see University Hills Beauty Academy v. Moun-
tain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 554 P.2d 723 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976) (holding liability limits in
contracts are subject to strictest scrutiny, but since directory services are wholly matter of
private concern, there is no duty to public); Morris v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 658
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One further characteristic illustrates that national uniformity no longer
controls the rate environment. Unlike the initial application of the doctrine
to rates that specifically incorporated varying levels of customer liability,230
Sprint customers do not choose between different levels of liability when se-
lecting service options. 231  Rather the exculpation clause applies across the
board to all tariffed services.232 Arguably, in Priester, customers were "on
notice" because they chose between repeated and unrepeated service with
the attendant assumption of risk.
2 3 3
C. Primary Jurisdiction
The final issue raised by Richman is whether the courts or the FCC
should decide whether to extend the doctrine of limited liability to nondomi-
nant carriers.2 34 Courts should not resort to the doctrine of primary juris-
diction purely out of administrative convenience.235 Although the FCC has
never ruled on the applicability of tariff liability clauses to nondominant car-
riers, 2 36 the Communications Act precludes the agency from overriding state
law remedies, 237 and the FCC deregulatory scheme lets the market regulate
competitive carriers.
2 38
A threshold consideration is whether the FCC has statutory authority to
"approve" tariffs which preempt state common law remedies. 239 A question
of an agency's statutory authority to regulate in a particular area is appropri-
ately decided by the courts. 24  Questions relating solely to tariff reasonable-
P.2d 1199 (Utah 1983) (holding telephone company not liable for lost profits in face of liability
limit in contract for directory services); Allen v. General Tel. Co., 578 P.2d 1333 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1978) (holding liability disclaimer in tariff valid and binding on customers subscribing to
yellow pages directory service).
230. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 154.
232. See, e.g., supra note 154 (setting forth the relevant tariff provision).
233. This rationale was rejected by the Court in Esteve in light of the specific direction in
the ICA permitting repeated and unrepeated rates. See supra notes 26, 29 and accompanying
text. Although the Communications Act also provides that services may be classified as re-
peated or unrepeated, 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1988), Sprint's tariffed rates do not reflect inherently
different levels of liability among which the customer chooses.
234. Brief for Appellant at 2, Richman Bros. Records v. U.S. Sprint Communications Co.,
Nos. 90-5607, 90-5657 (3d Cir. filed Oct. 1, 1990).
235. See, e.g., Jaffe, supra note 104.
236. Further Notice, supra note 2, at para. 96.
237. See 47 U.S.C. § 414.
238. Sixth Report, supra note 56, at para. 1.
239. See supra notes 161-76 and accompanying text.
240. See Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth. v. Valley Freight Sys., 856 F.2d 546, 549
(3d Cir. 1988) (holding that there is no support for the contention that an agency "has primary
jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction").
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ness, however, properly belong before the FCC.24 1 The issues to be decided
are those within the expertise and competence of the judiciary: common law
fraud, negligence, and contract claims.242 Similarly, these liability issues do
not require the special technical analysis or cost-allocation expertise of the
Commission.2 43 The doctrine of limited liability, created by the judiciary,
can be interpreted, applied, and extended by it as well. 2"
Finally, given the nature of the savings clause, the FCC may not be able to
make the determination. 245 The FCC may not preempt state law without
express empowerment from Congress. 246 The savings clause reserves those
rights to the states.247  Thus, the FCC's statutory authorization to limit
claims may not exist.
2 48
241. See In re Long Distance Telecom. Litig., 831 F.2d 627, 631 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding
that the reasonableness of carrier practices was squarely within the FCC's expertise).
242. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100-01 (1989).
243. See, e.g., Clark Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1373, 1381-82 (D.C. Del. 1985)
("primary jurisdiction should only be utilized if an agency's special technical or policy exper-
tise would be advantageous").
244. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Priester, 276 U.S. 252 (1928); Western Union Tel. Co.
v. Esteve Bros., 256 U.S. 566 (1921). Indeed, in the numerous state cases considering this
question, the court has only rarely referred the issue to the state commission. See, e.g., Jeffries
v. Glacier State Tel. Co., 604 P.2d 4 (Alaska 1979) (holding that when a disgruntled customer
complains of problem common to public, the issue is properly referred to Public Utility Com-
mission under primary jurisdiction, but when complainant suffers from an action that does not
effect the general public, the issue should be handled as traditional common law action by
judiciary); General Tel. Co. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 409 N.W.2d 133 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987)
(finding court would invoke primary jurisdiction to the agency on issue of tariff interpretation
because the question of tariff applicability was suited to agency expertise). But see Southern
Bell Tel. Co. v. Mobile Am. Corp., 291 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 1974) (holding that a court is not
required to refer issue to regulators when claim arises out of a tort); Kellerman v. MCI
Telecom. Corp., 493 N.E.2d 1045 (Ill. 1986) (holding that state law claims of fraud and decep-
tion are not preempted by the Communications Act and do not require reference to the FCC
under primary jurisdiction), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986); Moore v. Pacific Nw. Bell, 662
P.2d 398 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (holding primary jurisdiction inappropriate when claim was
telephone company negligence).
245. The FCC statutory mandate specifically states that the Commission may not override
state law remedies. 47 U.S.C. § 414 (1988).
246. The FCC indicated in its Competitive Carrier decisions its doubt as to its ability to
preempt state common law rights: "There is no explicit denial of common law contractual
rights contained in the statute, and in the absence of such express directive, we are not free to
infer an implied denial of those rights." Further Notice, supra note 2, at para. 96.
247. 47 U.S.C. § 414; see also Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 299-300
(1976).
248. See 47 U.S.C. § 414. This is consistent with rulings in Nader, 426 U.S. at 308, and In
re Long Distance Telecom. Litig., 831 F.2d 627, 634 (6th Cir. 1987).
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D. The Time Has Come to Change the Rules
The FCC has embarked on the path to deregulated competition. 24 9 As
the first step, the FCC adopted the use of a policy of permissive forbearance
to nondominant carriers on the theory these carriers will act as a bellwether
for industry-wide full and fair competition.25° In applying market theory as
a substitute for strict regulatory scrutiny, the FCC must be vigilant in al-
lowing the market to operate. 25' Thus, the fostering of a market driven
competitive telecommunications industry requires that the deregulated firms
not be granted the same opportunity to evade common law liability as other
public utilties.2 52
Competitive nondominant telephone companies respond to market signals
in the same way other competitive firms do.253 Because nondominant carri-
ers conduct business in the same manner as other companies, they should be
treated as all other competitive firms are treated. Competitive telecommuni-
cations carriers should not be permitted to escape liability for negligence or
misconduct based on unilateral tariff provisions that their customers have
not specifically agreed to or that afford the vast majority of customers no
notice or opportunity to read or understand. Such unilateral limitations are
not tolerated in other competitive industries, such as automobiles and air-
lines.25 4 Competitive carriers cannot avoid tariff and rate regulation and
then seek the benefits that accompany pervasive regulation of public utili-
ties. 255 Because the special "rules" granted to the regulated dominant firms,
such as tariff liability limitations or favored financial status,256 are an inte-
gral part of the quid pro quo for regulation, deregulated nondominant carri-
ers should not be entitled to these benefits.2 57
249. Further Notice, supra note 2, at para. 2.
250. Id. at para. 7.
251. Id. at para. 30.
252. See id. at para. 22 (indicating that application of traditional regulation on nondomi-
nant firms would impose costs that outweigh the benefits to regulation).
253. See Hearings, supra note 9, at 1082 (indicating that competition has stimulated most
innovative communications developments).
254. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960) (invalidat-
ing warranty provisions that limited liability for breach as an unconscionable adhesion con-
tract). Even in the pharmaceutical industry, which is pervasively regulated by the Food and
Drug Administration, there is no similar limitation on damages. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott
Lab., 607 P.3d 924 (Cal. 1980) (holding all manufacturers of DES liable for injuries resulting
from uses of the drug in proportion to their market share); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539
N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989) (adopting proportional liability for DES manufacturers based on
national market share).
255. See Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co. v. River Terminals Corp., 360 U.S. 411, 420
(1959).
256. Id.
257. "[S]ince the [local telephone] utility is strictly regulated in its rights and privileges, it
should likewise be regulated to some extent in its liabilities ...." Warner v. Southwestern Bell
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There would be no adverse consequences of refusing to extend the out-
dated Esteve doctrine beyond pervasively regulated utilities into the new era
of deregulated competitive carriers.25 8 First, any impact on rates would be
merely incidental.2 59 Second, carriers could and undoubtedly would protect
their shareholders and customers by obtaining tort liability insurance.2"
Third, nondominant carriers would still be permitted to price services using
tariffs, because imposing state common law liability would not affect carri-
ers' ability to comply with federal regulatory obligations.26' Fourth, and
most importantly, nondominant carriers could still exculpate themselves
from liability for negligence under state law simply by obtaining contractual
or other bargained-for consent from their customers.2 62 Thus, the only cer-
tain effect of a decision restricting the Esteve doctrine to regulated firms
would be that customers of competitive carriers would be placed on notice




The policies behind the imposition of unilateral tariff exculpation no
longer apply to the competitive telecommunications environment of the
1990s and beyond. As originally conceived, unilateral liability exculpation
preserved uniform rates for common carrier services. In the competitive en-
vironment of modern telecommunications, however, such a policy is anti-
thetical to the very nature of competition, where providers compete on the
basis of service and price for marketshare. Nondominant carriers are not
Tel. Co., 428 S.W.2d 596, 601 (Mo. 1968). This reasoning clearly does not apply to nondomi-
nant carriers which are not strictly regulated.
258. Id.
259. The Court in Nader specifically noted that any impact of rates from judgments would
be incidental. See Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 300 (1976).
260. It is pertinent that tort liability insurance was not widely available at the time that the
court decided the Esteve case. Tort liability insurance became more widely available after
World War I in response to growing public dissatisfaction with indemnity insurance. RICH-
ARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, at 883-84 (1990).
261. Title II requirements applicable to carriers' rates would still apply and would not be
compromised by removing non-bargained for exculpatory provisions. See Second Report,
supra note 56, at para. 12; Further Notice, supra note 2, at para. 96. The various benefits
outlined in MCI attendant to tariff filings would thus be undisturbed.
262. These contracts would be subject to traditional common law construction and review
applicable to adhesion contracts by the courts to determine innate fairness, thereby protecting
customers. See, e.g., University Hills Beauty Academy v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 554
P.2d 723 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976) (suggesting that contracts which limit a carrier's liability
should be subject to the strict scrutiny applied to adhesion contracts generally).
263. This is consistent with Sprint's position in an unrelated case. Answer of U.S. Sprint at
7, U.S. Sprint Communications Co. v. AT&T Communications, F.C.C. File No. E-90-113
(filed Apr. 18, 1990).
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pervasively regulated, but operate in a competitive environment, where inno-
vation is encouraged and price wars are the hallmark of competition. The
public no longer deserves the disservice of unilateral liability limitations.
Such a concession by a customer more properly accompanies a commensu-
rate price reduction accomplished through the process of contractual
bargaining.
Christy Cornell Kunin

